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NOTES
REGULARLY CONDUCTED NON-COLLUSIVE MORTGAGE
FORECLOSURE SALES: INAPPLICABILITY OF SECTION
548(a)(2) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
INTRODUCTION
The concept of "fraudulent conveyance" traditionally contem-
plated a debtor who disposed of his property with the intention of
defrauding his creditors.' To correct the inequities created by such
fraudulent conveyances, Congress2 and state legislatures3 have en-
acted statutes designed to protect defrauded creditors. These statutes
typically allow the fraudulent conveyance to be voided. 4
The current federal provision addressing fraudulent transfers is
section 548(a) (2) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code), 5
which provides:
The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property . .. within one year before the date of the filing of the
petition, if the debtor ... received less than a reasonably equiva-
lent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation; and ... was
insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obliga-
tion was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer
or obligation. 6
Historically, non-collusive mortgage foreclosure sales were virtually
never voided as fraudulent conveyances. 7 This remained true even
1. F. Wait, A Treatise on Fraudulent Conveyances and Creditors' Bills § 15, at
34-35 (3d ed. 1897); see D. Moore, A Treatise on Fraudulent Conveyances and
Creditors' Remedies 3-4 (1908).
2. See Bankruptcy Code of 1978 § 548, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2600 (1978)
(codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982)); Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67(d), 52 Stat. 840,
877 (1938) (superseded by 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982)).
3. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3439-3439.12 (West 1970 & Supp. 1983); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 6, §§ 1301-1302 (1974); Idaho Code §§ 55-910 to -922 (1979); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. §§ 566.11-.23 (1967); N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law §§ 270-281 (McKinney
1945 & Supp. 1982-1983); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 13-02-01 to -11 (1981).
4. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3439.07, .09 (West 1970 & Supp. 1983); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 6, §§ 1307, 1310 (1974); Idaho Code §§ 55-916, -918 (1974); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. §§ 566.17, .20 (1967); N.Y. Debt. & Cred. Law §§ 276, 278 (McKinney
1945); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 13-02-07, -09 (1981).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982).
6. Id.
7. Brief of Amici Curiae for California Bankers Association and California Bank
Clearing House Association at 16-18, Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., appeal
argued, No. 82-4433 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Amici Curiae
Brief]; Sec. Real Prop., Prob. & Trust L., A.B.A., Report to the House of Delegates,
No. 106B, at 3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. Report]; see, e.g., Pierce v. Pierce,
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when the property was sold for less than its fair market value. 8 In
1980, however, the Fifth Circuit in Durrett v. Washington National
Insurance Co.9 interpreted section 67(d) of the Chandler Act of 1938
(Chandler Act),IO the predecessor of section 548(a)(2) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, to mean that a trustee in bankruptcy has the power to
avoid a non-collusive mortgage foreclosure sale."
16 Cal. App. 375, 383, 117 P. 580, 583 (1911); Harris v. Wagshal, 343 A.2d 283, 294-
95 (D.C. 1975); Citizens State Bank v. Haworth, 208 Iowa 1100, 1105, 222 N.W.
428, 430 (1928); Reeves v. Miller, 121 Mich. 311, 313, 80 N.W. 19, 19 (1899);
Bourgeois v. Edwards, 104 A. 447, 449 (N.J. Ch. 1918); Magruder v. Clayton, 29
S.C. 407, 413, 7 S.E. 844, 848 (1888); Brown v. O'Meara, 193 S.W.2d 715, 720 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1946). But see Langan v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 277 A.D. 1090, 1091,
101 N.Y.S.2d 36, 37 (4th Dept. 1950) (per curiam), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 932, 100 N.E.2d
189 (1951). The Langan court held that the sale of a corporation's assets at foreclo-
sure for half of their market value constituted a fraudulent conveyance. Id. at 1091,
101 N.Y.S.2d at 37. The dissent argued that "[t]he foreclosure of the mortgage was
legal in all respects and there was no duty on the part of the bank . . . to the
unsecured creditors to bid in the property for its full market value .... The infer-
ence is that the defendants were acting in honest defense of their own business
interests." Id. at 1091, 101 N.Y.S.2d at 37-38 (Kimball & Taylor, JJ., dissenting).
8. Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 17; see, e.g., Harris v. Wagshal, 343
A.2d 283, 286, 295 (D.C. 1975); Laflin v. Central Publishing House, 52 Ill. 432, 434
(1869); Citizens State Bank v. Haworth, 208 Iowa 1100, 1101-05, 222 N.W. 428,
429-30 (1928); Reeves v. Miller, 121 Mich. 311, 312, 80 N.W. 19, 19 (1899). But see
Langan v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 277 A.D. 1090, 1091, 101 N.Y.S.2d 36, 37 (4th
Dept- 1950) (per curiam) (affirming finding of fraudulent transfer when corporate
assets worth over $50,000 were sold for $25,000), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 932, 100 N.E.2d
189 (1951).
9. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
10. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67(d), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938) (superseded by 11
U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982)).
11. See Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980).
Other courts have followed Durrett's approach and applied § 548(a)(2) to non-
collusive mortgage foreclosure sales. E.g., Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust
Co., 647 F.2d 547, 548-49 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982);
Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1982); Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Inc. v. Equitable Trust Co., 23
Bankr. 36, 39 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 20 Bankr. 988,
993 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); Wickham v. United Am. Bank (In re Thompson), 18
Bankr. 67, 70 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
The implications of Durrett's holding extend beyond § 548(a)(2). Section 544(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code allows the trustee to avoid any transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property that is voidable under applicable law by specified creditors. 11
U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982). If Durrett's holding is applied to § 544(b), the remedies
available under state fraudulent conveyance statutes may be used to void non-
collusive mortgage foreclosure sales. Because the trustee filing an action under
§ 544(b) is not limited by the one year provision in § 548(a)(2), Durrett would subject
non-collusive mortgage foreclosure sales to attack for an indefinite time. See Coppel
& Kann, Defanging Durrett: The Established Law of "Transfer," 100 Banking L.J.
676, 681 n.14 (1983).
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In the aftermath of the Durrett decision, courts have taken positions
in conflict with the Fifth Circuit.12 The Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Alaska, for example, held that a foreclosure sale was not
voidable because the transfer of the property at the foreclosure sale
related back to the execution of the deed of trust, which occurred
more than one year before the filing of the petition. 3 Alternatively,
the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit has taken the
position that the price received for property at a non-collusive and
regularly conducted mortgage foreclosure sale should be presumed to
be "reasonably equivalent value,' 4 effectively precluding avoidance
12. Alden, Gross & Borowitz, Real Property Foreclosure as a Fraudulent Con-
veyance: Proposalsfor Solving the Durrett Problem, 38 Bus. Law. 1605, 1607 (1983).
Compare Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980)
(mortgage foreclosure sales are among transfers voidable under § 67(d)) and Home
Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 20 Bankr. 988, 994 n.23 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (§ 548(a)(2) is
applicable to foreclosure sales) with Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr.
424, 427 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), appeal argued, No. 82-4433 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 1983)
(applying presumption that "reasonably equivalent value" is received at regularly
conducted, non-collusive mortgage foreclosure sales and effectively removing such
sales from consideration under § 548(a)(2)) and Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 986
(Bankr. D. Alaska 1981) (transfer of property effected at foreclosure sale related back
to date of execution of deed of trust, rendering foreclosure sale non-voidable), afl'd,
22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982).
13. Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 987 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), aff'd, 22
Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982). In reaching its conclusion, the Alsop court noted that
§ 548(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code deems a transfer to occur when it is so far
perfected that a bona fide purchaser could not have obtained an interest superior to
that of the transferee. Id. Further, the court stated that under state law, the title of
the purchaser at the foreclosure sale related back to the time of execution of the deed
of trust. Id. Because no person purchasing in good faith from the debtor could have
obtained title superior to that of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale after the
execution of the deed of trust, the transfer was deemed to have occurred when the
deed was executed. Id. The court conceded that the mortgage foreclosure sale might
well constitute a transfer under the definition set forth in § 101(41) of the Bankruptcy
Code. The court ruled, however, that for the purposes of § 548(a)(2) the transfer
actually took place when the debtor executed the deed of trust, more than a year
before he filed his petition. Thus, the foreclosure was not subject to avoidance under
the fraudulent transfer provision of the Bankruptcy Code. Id.
The Alsop rationale was criticized in Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re
Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982), which questioned the Alsop
court's failure to consider the transfer of the debtor's equity in the property rather
than the transfer of title. Id. at 445-46. Because the transfer of debtor's equity is the
transfer the trustee seeks to avoid, and because this occurs only at the mortgage
foreclosure sale, the Richardson court concluded that a mortgage foreclosure sale did
constitute a transfer for the purposes of § 548(a)(2). See id. at 446.
14. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 427 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1982), appeal argued, No. 82-4433 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 1983); see Moore v. Gilmore,
No. C-83-232, slip op. at 4, 7 (E.D. Wash. July 6, 1983) (utilizing the Madrid
presumption to uphold a sheriffs sale); Rosner v. Worcester, 28 Bankr. 910, 915
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983) (adopting Madrid analysis and setting aside a foreclosure
sale that was not regularly conducted).
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of non-collusive mortgage foreclosure sales under section 548(a)(2).15
Part I of this Note identifies the types of transfers that should be
subject to voidability under section 548(a)(2) through analysis of the
common law of fraudulent conveyances and the incorporation of the
common law into statutory law, concluding that the application of
this section to void non-collusive mortgage foreclosure sales contra-
venes the intent of Congress. Part II interprets the "reasonably equiva-
lent value" requirement of section 548(a)(2) (A) and argues that in the
context of a non-collusive mortgage foreclosure sale, "reasonably
equivalent value" should be interpreted as being the price received for
the property sold at such a sale. Part III of .this Note analyzes the
policy considerations involved in the application of section 548(a)(2)
to non-collusive foreclosure sales and concludes that detrimental eco-
nomic effects as well as substantial interference with state foreclosure
policies would result from such an application.
I. MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE SALES AS TRANSFERS
A. Textual Interpretation of "Transfer"
Section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee in bank-
ruptcy to avoid specified transfers of the debtor's interest in prop-
erty. 16 Section 101(41) defines transfer as "every mode, direct or indi-
rect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of
or parting with property or with an interest in property, including
retention of title as a security interest."' 7
The transfer of the debtor's property to the purchaser of his prop-
erty at a non-collusive mortgage foreclosure sale arguably falls within
the plain meaning'8 of section 101(41). For the purposes of section
548(a)(2), however, this literal interpretation should not prevail be-
cause it is inconsistent with the intent of Congress.' 9
B. Intent of the Legislature
1. The Statute of 13 Elizabeth and the Common Law
The legislative history of section 548(a)(2) is rooted in one of the
earliest statutory attacks on fraudulent conveyances in the English
15. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 427 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1982), appeal argued, No. 82-4433 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 1983).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982).
17. Id. § 101(41) (1982).
18. The interpretation of a statute must begin with an examination of the plain
meaning of its language. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construc-
tion § 46.01 (4th ed. 1973).
19. See infra notes 20-63 and accompanying text. One exception to the "plain
meaning" rule is that the literal interpretation of the statute should not be followed
when it is inconsistent with legislative intent. 2A C. Sands, supra note 18, § 46.07.
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system of law-the Statute of 13 Elizabeth .20 This statute, which was
enacted in 1570, provided for the voiding of all conveyances by
debtors which were intended to "delay, hinder or defraud credi-
tors."' In the United States, the Statute of 13 Elizabeth was "univer-
sally adopted" in common law as the basis of American jurisprudence
on the subject.2 2
At common law, state courts typically set aside collusive and fraud-
ulent sales held under a foreclosure of a mortgage or a deed of trust on
real or personal property.2 3 Those sales in which no fraud had been
shown, however, were not voided by the vast majority of state
courts. 24 Such sales were upheld even when less than market value had
been received for the property.25 Most courts, in fact, simply assumed
that non-collusive mortgage foreclosure sales were not in the class of
voidable fraudulent transfers. 26
2. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act
In order to promote harmony in the law of fraudulent conveyances,
the National Conference on Uniform State Laws and the American
Bar Association approved the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(UFCA) 27 in 1918.28 Although the UFCA adopted the concepts under-
20. Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances, 1570, 13 Eliz., ch. 5., quoted in G.
Glenn, The Law of Fraudulent Conveyances § 53, at 85 (1931); see H.R. Rep. No.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1977); 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 548.01, at 548-3 (L.
King 15th ed. 1983).
21. Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances, 1570, 13 Eliz., ch. 5, quoted in G.
Glenn, supra note 20, § 53, at 85.
22. 1 D. Moore, supra note 1, at 12; F. Wait, supra note 1, § 19, at 44.
23. See Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 16-19; 1 G. Glenn, Fraudulent
Conveyances and Preferences § 214a, at 367 (rev. ed. 1940); A.B.A. Report, supra
note 7, at 3; see, e.g., Isaacson v. Union Trust Co., 210 Cal. 473, 475-76, 292 P. 448,
449 (1930); W.H. Collins Ice Cream Co. v. Talmage, 210 Ill. App. 374, 375 (1918);
Joseph P. Manning Co. v. Shinopoulos, 317 Mass. 97, 100, 56 N.E.2d 869, 871
(1944); Citizens Bank v. Robinson, 342 Mo. 697, 712, 117 S.W.2d 263, 271 (1937);
Fernhaber v. Stein, 182 Wis. 61, 69-70, 195 N.W. 906, 909 (1923).
24. Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 16-18; see, e.g., Pierce v. Pierce, 16 Cal.
App. 375, 383, 117 P. 580, 583 (1911); Citizens State Bank v. Haworth, 208 Iowa
1100, 1105, 222 N.W. 428, 430 (1928); Reeves v. Miller, 121 Mich. 311, 312-13, 80
N.W. 19, 19 (1899); Bourgeois v. Edwards, 104 A. 447, 449 (N.J. Ch. 1918);
Magruder v. Clayton, 29 S.C. 407, 413, 7 S.E. 844, 848 (1888); Brown v. O'Meara,
193 S.W.2d 715, 720 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
25. Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 17-18; see, e.g., Harris v. Wagshal, 343
A.2d 283, 295 (D.C. 1975); Laflin v. Central Publishing House, 52 Ill. 432, 434
(1869); Citizens State Bank v. Haworth, 208 Iowa 1100, 1101-05, 222 N.W. 428,
429-30 (1928); Reeves v. Miller, 121 Mich. 311, 312, 80 N.W. 19, 19 (1899).
26. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
27. Unif. Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 7A U.L.A. 161 (1978).
28. Id. Historical Note.
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lying the Statute of 13 Elizabeth to a large extent, 2  there were
changes in language.
Section 4 of the UFCA provided: "Every conveyance and every
obligation incurred by a person who is or will be thereby rendered
insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his actual
intent if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without
a fair consideration. ' 30 This language differed from the language in
the Statute of 13 Elizabeth in that it removed the requirement of a
showing of an actual intent by the debtor to defraud his creditors.
3
'
Thus, section 4 was potentially applicable to non-collusive mortgage
foreclosure sales in which a low price was received for the property.
The Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the UFCA (Note) ,32 however,
indicated that it was not the intention of the drafters to bring about
such a radical change in the law.
In advancing the rationale behind the language in section 4, the
Note acknowledged that many conveyances are made in which credi-
tors are wronged, but in which there is no intent to defraud on the
part of the debtor. 33 In such cases, many courts had presumed intent
in order to do justice but, in doing so, had "pushed [the] presumption
of fraud as a fact to an unwarranted extent. 34 To avoid the necessity
of employing such a questionable rationale, the Note stated that "[i]n
the Act as drafted all possibility of a presumption of law as to intent is
avoided," but those "conveyances which the courts have in practice
condemned . . . are declared fraudulent irrespective of intent. ' 35
Thus, the drafters indicated their intention to codify under section 4
of the UFCA only those common law cases in which presumptions of
fraud were utilized to condemn certain conveyances. The vast major-
ity of courts, however, did not condemn non-collusive foreclosure
sales. 36 It is highly unlikely, therefore, that section 4 of the UFCA was
intended to apply to non-collusive foreclosure sales.
29. See Hay v. Duskin, 455 P.2d 281, 286 (Ariz. App. 1969) ('[T]he Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act... is declaratory of the common law and a restatement
of the statute of 13 Elizabeth."); Dorrington v. Jacobs, 252 N.W. 307, 309 (Wis.
1934) ("The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act... may be said to be a restate-
ment of the Statute of 13 Elizabeth."); H.R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 32
(1937) ("[T]he Uniform Act is largely declaratory of the better decisions of American
State courts construing the Statute of Elizabeth.").
30. Unif. Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 4, 7A U.L.A. 205 (1978).
31. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
32. Unif. Fraudulent Conveyance Act, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 7A
U.L.A. 161.
33. Id. at 162.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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3. Section 67(d)(2) of the Chandler Act
In 1938, Congress passed the Chandler Act, 37 which made many
substantive amendments to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (Bankruptcy
Act) .38 Among these amendments was the addition of section 67(d) (2),39
which incorporated a condensed version of section 4 of the UFCA. 40
Although section 4 of the UFCA as adopted in section 67(d)(2) re-
mained substantially intact, one significant change was made by the
drafters of the Chandler Act: The word "conveyance" was replaced
with "transfer. '41 At first impression, the change in language of the
UFCA found in section 67(d)(2) of the Chandler Act may evince an
intent on the part of Congress to expand the application of this section
to areas previously unaffected by section 4 of the UFCA because the
definition of "transfer" in the Chandler Act includes involuntary dis-
positions of property. 42 Concededly, non-collusive mortgage foreclo-
sure sales are included within this definition of "transfer. '43 Evidence
indicating that Congress did not intend such sales to be voidable under
section 67(d)(2), however, may be gleaned from committee reports
and prints discussing this section.
37. Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (superseded by 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-
151,326 (1982)).
38. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (superseded by 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-151,326 (1982)).
39. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67(d)(2), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938) (superseded by 11
U.S.C. § 548 (1982)).
40. National Bankruptcy Conference, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., Analysis of H.R.
12889, at 214 n.3 (Comm. Print 1936) [hereinafter cited as Analysis of H.R. 12889].
41. Compare Unif. Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 4, 7A U.L.A. 205 (1978) with
Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67(d)(2), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938) (superseded by 11 U.S.C.
§ 548 (1982)). Another change was made by the drafters of the Chandler Act. Under
§ 67(d) (2) of the Act, avoidance of the transfer required that a petition in bankruptcy
be filed by the debtor within one year after the date of transfer. Chandler Act, ch.
575, § 67(d)(2), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938). The UFCA, in contrast, which did not
address itself specifically to bankruptcy situations, did not contain any time require-
ment. Unif. Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 4, 7A U.L.A. 205 (1978). An action to
avoid a fraudulent conveyance under the UFCA, therefore, must be brought within
the applicable state statute of limitations.
42. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 1(30), 52 Stat. 840, 842 (1938) (superseded by 11
U.S.C. § 101(41) (1982)). "Transfer" is defined in § 1(30) of the Chandler Act as:
[T]he sale and every other and different mode, direct or indirect, of dispos-
ing of or of parting with property or with an interest therein or with the
possession thereof or of fixing a lien upon property or upon an interest
therein, absolutely or conditionally, voluntarily or involuntarily, by or
without judicial proceedings, as a conveyance, sale, assignment, payment,
pledge, mortgage, lien, encumbrance, gift, security, or otherwise.
Id.
43. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980); see
Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1982); Alden, Gross & Borowitz, supra note 12, at 1608.
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In its analysis of section 67(d)(2), for example, a House Committee
Report indicated an intent to incorporate the UFCA into the Bank-
ruptcy Act because the Committee approved of the common law that
had been incorporated into the UFCA. 44 The Committee stated that
the UFCA represented the reasoning of the better decisions of those
American courts that had interpreted the Statute of 13 Elizabeth. 45 In
addition, the notes of the drafters of section 67(d) indicate that the
application of the section was designed to mimic to a large degree the
application of section 4 of the UFCA. 46 Jacob I. Weinstein, one of the
drafters of section 67, explained that the drafters had "condensed the
provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, retaining its
substance and, as far as possible, its language. ' 47
Weinstein further explained that the change in language of the
statute from "conveyance" to "transfer" was made "[i]n order to
achieve uniformity [of] terminology" throughout the Bankruptcy
Act.48 The drafters, therefore, did not intend the change in language
to be of substantive importance in incorporating the UFCA into the
Chandler Act. Consequently, the use of the term "transfer" in section
67(d) (2) was not intended to bring under its purview any conveyances
not condemned by the common law or the UFCA, such as non-
collusive foreclosure sales.
There is, however, some evidence to the effect that the application
of section 67(d) was not intended to duplicate entirely the previous
application of the UFCA by state courts. The original draft of section
67(d) contained the following qualification: "The provisions of this
subdivision shall be interpreted and construed so far as possible in
uniformity with the law whenever the Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act is enacted. ' 49 This segment did not appear in the final
44. See H.R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1937).
45. Id.; see Analysis of H.R. 12889, supra note 40, at 213 n.3 (quoting Prof.
James Angell McLaughlin, a drafter of the UFCA).
46. Analysis of H.R. 12889, supra note 40, at 213-14 n.3.
47. Id. at 214 n.3.
48. Id. at 7 (Weinstein note); see H.R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1937). Because "transfer" was used in various sections of the Bankruptcy Act, it
became necessary to expand the definition so that the term encompassed all its uses.
Analysis of H.R. 12889, supra note 40, at 7 (Weinstein note); see H.R. Rep. No.
1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1937). Thus, the use of the word "transfer," with its
broadened definition, was intended to coordinate the language of the Bankruptcy
Act and not to change the law of fraudulent conveyances. Cf. Coppel & Kann, supra
note 11, at 696 & n.74. Coppel and Kann cite to the legislative history of the
Chandler Act and view the drafters' stated purpose of coordinating language in the
Bankruptcy Act as an indication that Congress did not intend to change the law of
transfer. Id.
49. Analysis of H.R. 12889, supra note 40, at 217.
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version of the bill50 and, therefore, federal courts could interpret
section 67(d) as they saw fit. 51 Nevertheless, because the drafters
clearly indicated that the application of section 67(d) was intended to
be guided by previous case law, it is not likely that the omission
represented a move away from adherence to the underlying principles
of the UFCA.
4. Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code
In 1978, the Bankruptcy Act was superseded by the Bankruptcy
Code. Section 67(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act was replaced and sim-
plified5 2 by section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.53 The Commis-
sion on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, created by Con-
gress to recommend changes in the bankruptcy laws, explained in its
report: "Section 67(d) is modeled upon the Uniform Fraudulent Con-
veyance Act. The Commission believes that it has worked satisfacto-
rily and it does not recommend any substantial changes therein, ex-
cept a simplification of its extremely complex language."5 4 This
statement indicates that no dramatic change in the law was envi-
sioned.5 s Such an interpretation is strengthened by the absence of any
legislative history directly supporting the application of section
548(a)(2) to new types of transfers such as non-collusive mortgage
foreclosure sales.56 In fact, the unprecedented application of section
548(a)(2) to void regularly conducted non-collusive mortgage foreclo-
sure sales has recently inspired a legislative attempt to amend section
548 specifically to exclude such sales from the type of transfers that
could be avoided. 57
50. See Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67, 52 Stat. 840, 875 (1938) (superseded by 11
U.S.C. § 548 (1982)).
51. 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 67.29, at 481 (L. King & J. Moore 14th ed. 1978).
Although federal courts could have interpreted § 67(d) independently, it was be-
lieved that the federal courts would find the case law under the UFCA persuasive and
profit by the experience that had been gained from the operation of the Act. Id. at
481-82.
52. Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States,
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Commission
Report].
53. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982).
54. Commission Report, supra note 52, at 20. Congress adopted these recom-
mendations of the Commission upon enacting the fraudulent transfer section of the
Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982).
55. See Commission Report, supra note 52, at 20.
56. See H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. Rep. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); Commission Report, supra note 52.
57. Gold, Proposed Amendment to Clarify Status of Property Bought in Foreclo-
sure, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 17, 1982, at 30, col. 4. Under this proposed amendment,
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There was, however, an additional change in the language of the
Bankruptcy Code that merits consideration: The definition of transfer
was expanded in section 101(41). 58 The legislative history of that
section evinces an intent to broaden the definition to include as many
dispositions of property as possible. 59 An expansion of transfers void-
able under section 548(a)(2) to include non-collusive mortgage fore-
closure sales, however, would severely undermine the traditional ap-
plication of section 67(d)(2). 60 Thus, it is unlikely that a radical
change of this kind was intended.
The legislative history of section 548(a)(2) demonstrates that in
enacting this section in 1978, Congress was approving the common
law of fraudulent conveyances"' just as Congress had done in 1938 in
enacting section 67(d)(2) of the Chandler Act, and the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws had done in approv-
ing the UFCA in 1918. At common law, non-collusive mortgage
foreclosure sales were not usually voidable, 62 even when prices below
market value were received for the property.63 Consequently, such
purchasers obtaining title to an interest of the debtor in property pursuant to a bona
fide prepetition foreclosure sale would automatically take for reasonably equivalent
value, and thus, that transfer would be protected from avoidance. Id. According to
Robert M. Zinman, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Federal Bankruptcy Legisla-
tion of the American Council of Life Insurance, an organization that has supported
legislation to abrogate the Durrett rule, after a controversial change in language was
proposed by Senator Metzenbaum's staff, the anti-Durrett language was deleted from
S.445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) because there was insufficient time before it was
to be submitted to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to resolve the controversy.
Douglas Comer, Chief Counsel to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts,
reported to Mr. Zinman that neither the Senate nor its Committee on the Judiciary
considered the merits of the proposed anti-Durrett language. Telephone interview
with Robert M. Zinman, Chairman of the Subcommitee on Federal Bankruptcy
Legislation of the American Council of Life Insurance (Nov. 28, 1983).
58. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (1982) with Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 1(30), 52
Stat. 840, 842 (1938).
59. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 314 (1977); see Alden, Gross &
Borowitz, supra note 12, at 1608.
60. Prior to the decision in Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201
(5th Cir. 1980), no court had applied constructive fraudulent transfer provisions to
set aside a properly conducted non-collusive foreclosure sale. A.B.A. Report, supra
note 7, at 3. Although § 67(d) was enacted in 1938, the A.B.A. Report found no case
that had applied that section to set aside a properly conducted non-collusive foreclo-
sure sale. Id. The dissent in Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982), noted with interest that "Durrett
[was] the first case treating this problem-after 90 years of bankruptcy law and.
mortgages of a time greater than the memory of man. It again establishes what an
imaginative lawyer can do when he adds persuasion." Id. at 550 (Clark, J., dissent-
ing).
61. See S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 89-90 (1978); See H.R. Rep. No.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1977).
62. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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transfers should not be subject to avoidance under section 548(a) (2) of
the Bankruptcy Code. An analysis of the "reasonably equivalent
value" requirement in section 548(a)(2)(A) further supports the con-
clusion that non-collusive mortgage foreclosure sales should not be
voidable under section 548(a)(2).
II. "REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE" AT FORECLOSURE SALES
A. Differing Positions on "Reasonably Equivalent Value"
In order to avoid a transfer, section 67(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Act
required a showing that the insolvent debtor had not received "fair
consideration" in exchange for his property. 64 In 1978, section 67(d)(2)
was superseded by section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code,6 5 with a
concomitant change in language. 6 Under section 548(a) (2), avoidance
is predicated upon the debtor not receiving "reasonably equivalent
value" in exchange for the property. Courts have differed in their
application of these sections in the context of non-collusive mortgage
foreclosure sales.6 8
In Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co.,69 the court de-
termined that a mortgage foreclosure sale was a transfer under section
67(d)(2)70 and held that the price paid for the debtor's property at the
sale, approximately fifty-eight percent of the fair market value, did
not constitute fair consideration.7 ' The court based its decision on the
fact that it was unable to locate a decision of any court that had
approved the transfer of real property, subject to attack under section
67(d)(2), for which less than seventy percent of the market value had
been received.72 Consequently, the Durrett court voided the foreclo-
sure sale as a fraudulent transfer.7 3 Although Durrett did not establish
a per se rule requiring seventy percent of fair market value to uphold a
challenged foreclosure sale, several courts following Durrett have
64. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67(d)(2), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938) (superseded by 11
U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982)).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982).
66. Compare Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67(d)(2), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938) with 11
U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982).
67. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982).
68. See infra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
69. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
70. Id. at 204. The Durrett court based its determination upon the "comprehen-
sive character" of the definition of transfer in § 1(30) of the Bankruptcy Act. Id. In
reaching its conclusion, however, the court failed to consider the legislative history of
§ 67(d) indicating that Congress did not wish to render non-collusive foreclosure sales
voidable. See supra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
71. 621 F.2d at 203-04.
72. Id. at 203.
73. Id. at 204.
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seized upon the seventy percent language to establish a quantitative
figure for computing "reasonably equivalent value" under section
548(a) (2) (A.).74
Recently, Durrett was rejected by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
for the Ninth Circuit in Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Madrid.5
Confronted with a factual situation similar to Durrett,76 the Madrid
court reversed a lower court decision that held "reasonably equivalent
value" had not been paid to the debtor at a non-collusive foreclosure
sale because the seventy percent test was not met. 77 The appellate
court in Madrid construed "reasonably equivalent value," as defined
in section 548(a)(2)(A), "to mean the same as the consideration re-
ceived at a non-collusive and regularly conducted foreclosure sale. '78
Thus, the transfer in question was not subject to avoidance.
In reaching its conclusion, the Madrid court indicated that Durrett
had based its calculations on cases in which voluntary and private
transfers had occurred. 79 The standard imposed by these cases, noted
the court in Madrid, was not appropriate in the case of a regularly
conducted foreclosure sale because such a sale is open to all bidders
and creditors and, therefore, is "a safeguard against the evils of pri-
vate transfers to relatives and favorites."80
The language of section 548(a)(2)(A) is nct determinative of how
the requirement of "reasonably equivalent value" is to be interpreted.
It is necessary, therefore, to further analyze this requirement by exam-
74. See Coleman v. Home Say. Ass'n, 21 Bankr. 832, 834 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1982); Wickham v. United Am. Bank (In re Thompson), 18 Bankr. 67, 70 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1982); Madrid v. Del Mar Commerce Co., 10 Bankr. 795, 800 (Bankr.
D. Nev. 1981), rev'd sub nom. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), appeal argued, No. 82-4433 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 1983); cf.
Bakst v. Scarpa (In re Ocean Devs. of Am., Inc.), 22 Bankr. 834, 836 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1982) (voluntary conveyance of real property). Other cases have adopted Dur-
rett's position that a non-collusive mortgage foreclosure sale is a transfer for the
purposes of § 548(a)(2), but have not utilized the 70 % rule, preferring to examine all
the circumstances. E.g., Richard v. Tempest, 26 Bankr. 560, 562 (Bankr. D.R.I.
1983); Cooper v. Smith, 24 Bankr. 19, 23 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982); Gillman v.
Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448 (Bankr. D. Utah
1982); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 20 Bankr. 988, 994 n.23 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
75. 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), appeal argued, No. 82-4433 (9th Cir.
Feb. 18, 1983).
76. Madrid involved a non-judicial foreclosure sale under a deed of trust in
which the property at issue was sold for less than 30 % of its fair market value. Id. at
425.
77. Id., rev'g Madrid v. Del Mar Commerce Co., 10 Bankr. 795, 800 (Bankr. D.
Nev. 1981).
78. Id. at 427; see Rosner v. Worcester, 28 Bankr. 910, 914-15 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1983).
79. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 426 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1982), appeal argued, No. 82-4433 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 1983).
80. Id. at 427.
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ining the various definitions assigned to the term "value" in different
sections of the Bankruptcy Code and other extrinsic evidence.
B. Analysis of "Reasonably Equivalent Value"
1. Value
Section 548(d)(2)(A) defines "value" for the purposes of section 548
as "property, or satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent
debt of the debtor."8 ' Although this section lists the items that consti-
tute "value," it fails to explain how "value" is to be calculated. 2 This
omission is highly significant in light of the fact that special instruc-
tions for calculating "value" are set forth in other sections of the
Bankruptcy Code.83
In section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code,8 4 for example, which de-
scribes the property that can be exempted from the debtor's estate,
"value" is defined as the "fair market value as of the date of the filing
of the petition." 5 Under section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code,88 which
deals with the determination of secured status, "value" is "determined
in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition
or use of such property. '"87
Unlike other sections of the Bankruptcy Code which provide spe-
cific instructions for calculating "value," section 548 provides no such
instructions. Therefore, defining "value" in section 548 as fair market
value, and using an arbitrary figure of seventy percent of fair market
value as constituting reasonable equivalence, as suggested in the Dur-
rett decision, is inappropriate.88 In the absence of specific instructions
for calculating "reasonably equivalent value," the majority of courts
81. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (1982).
82. The report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States
also fails to explain how "reasonably equivalent value" is to be calculated. See
Commission Report, supra note 52, at 177. In analyzing the proposed replacement of
§ 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act, the Commission's only reference to the value require-
ment was: "There is no need to define fair consideration since taken care of in the
invalidating rules." [sic] Id. This comment appears to have been garbled in the
printing of the report, see Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23
Bankr. 434, 444 n.13 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982), and consequently there is no uniform
definition of "reasonably equivalent value."
83. E.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 522 (1982); see Brief for Appellee at 12, Madrid v.
Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., appeal argued, No. 82-4433 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as Appellee Brief].
84. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982).
85. Id. § 522(a)(2).
86. Id. § 506.
87. Id. § 506(a).
88. Cooper v. Smith, 24 Bankr. 19, 23 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982); see Lawyers
Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 426 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), appeal
argued, No. 82-4433 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 1983); Richard v. Tempest, 26 Bankr. 560,
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has evaluated the value given in exchange for the debtor's property by
investigating all the circumstances surrounding the transfer.89 This
approach is clearly less arbitrary than the seventy percent rule and
allows for the consideration of special circumstances inherent in fore-
closure sales" that would not be considered under a Durrett ap-
proach. In the context of a forced sale such as a mortgage foreclosure
sale, the special circumstances must be taken into consideration.
The accepted legal definition of "fair market value" is "[t]he
amount at which property would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy
or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.""1
In a mortgage foreclosure sale the debtor is not a willing seller. 2
Furthermore, several factors normally employed to arrive at fair mar-
ket value,9 3 such as reasonable time to find a purchaser, competition
with other similar properties in the open market and the most profit-
able use of the property, are absent in the case of a mortgage foreclo-
sure sale. 94 It is very likely, therefore, that a price below fair market
value will be paid for property sold at such a sale. 5
562 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23
Bankr. 434, 448 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 20 Bankr. 988,
994 n.23 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
89. 1 Collier Bankruptcy Manual 548.04, at 548-8 (L. King 3d ed. 1983); Cook,
Fraudulent Transfer Liability Under the Bankruptcy Code, 17 Hous. L. Rev. 263,
277 (1980); Coppel & Kann, supra note 11, at 679 n.10; see In re Southern Land
Title Corp., 474 F.2d 1033, 1037 n.5 (5th Cir. 1973); Darby v. Atkinson (In re
Ferris), 415 F. Supp. 33, 40 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Murdock v. Plymouth Enters. (In re
Curtina Int'l, Inc.), 23 Bankr. 969, 974 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); Gillman v. Preston
Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
90. See Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir.
1981) (Clark, J., dissenting) (foreclosure sales generally do not bring the best price),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 987 (Bankr. D.
Alaska 1981) (participation at foreclosure sales is minimal), aff'd, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D.
Alaska 1982); see also Lifton, Real Estate in Trouble: Lender's Remedies Need an
Overhaul, 31 Bus. Law. 1927, 1937 (1976) (the mortgagee is the only bidder at 99 %
of public foreclosure sales).
91. Black's Law Dictionary 537 (5th ed. 1979); see Almota Farmers Elevator &
Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 474 (1973); State v. Cooper Alloy
Corp., 136 N.J. Super. 560, 567, 347 A.2d 365, 368 (App. Div. 1975); H. Albritton,
A Critique of the Prevailing Definition of Market Value, in Controversies in Real
Property Valuation: A Commentary 7 (1982); J. Bonbright, The Valuation of Prop-
erty 841 (1937).
92. Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price Inadequacy in
Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 843, 870-71 (1980).
93. Black's Law Dictionary 537 (5th ed. 1979); see Wickham v. United Am.
Bank (In re Thompson), 18 Bankr. 67, 70 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982); State v. Cooper
Alloy Corp., 136 N.J. Super. 560, 567-68, 347 A.2d 365; 368 (App. Div. 1975); H.
Albritton, supra note 91, at 8.
94. See Lifton, supra note 90, at 1936-37.
95. Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Clark, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); Washburn, supra note 92,
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Consistent with the notion that receipt of less than fair market
value is common at regularly conducted mortgage foreclosure sales,
state law recognizes that absent some element of fraud, unfairness or
irregularity, the legitimacy of such sales should not be challenged
simply because of inadequacy of price. 96 To ensure that the low price
received at a foreclosure sale is not the result of a defect occurring in
the sales process, state law generally provides procedural safeguards
such as notice requirements97 and public sales.98 Because the receipt of
value at a regularly conducted foreclosure sale is regulated by state
law, and in addition, the probability of receiving fair market value at
such sales is low, the actual price received best reflects these special
circumstances. 9 Accordingly, the requirement in section 548(a)(2)
that "reasonably equivalent value" be exchanged is best interpreted by
holding that this requirement is presumptively met at a regularly
conducted non-collusive mortgage foreclosure sale.
In addition, the state law position that the legitimacy of foreclosure
sales should be upheld in the absence of irregularities comports with
at 870-71; see Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434,
446 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
96. E.g., Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Co., 21 Bankr. 424, 427 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1982), appeal argued, No. 82-4433 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 1983); Oiler v. Sonoma County
Land Title Co., 137 Cal. App. 2d 633, 635, 290 P.2d 880, 882 (1955); Golden v.
Tomiyasu, 79 Nev. 503, 515-16, 387 P.2d 989, 995 (1963), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 844
(1965); see G. Osborne, G. Nelson & D. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law § 7.21,
at 479 (1979); A.B.A. Report, supra note 7, at 5.
97. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 2924(b) (West Supp. 1983); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-37-
113(2) to (3) (1982); Idaho Code § 45-1506 (1977); Miss. Code Ann. § 89-1-55 (1972);
Wash. Rev. Code § 61.24-.040 (Supp. 1983); see G. Osborne, G. Nelson & D.
Whitman, supra note 96, § 7.16, at 467 (judicial foreclosure); id. § 7.19, at 475
(power of sale foreclosure).
Judicial foreclosure is the "most pervasive method of foreclosure" in the United
States. Id. § 7.11, at 447. Such foreclosure typically invokes, inter alia, a preliminary
title search which is used to determine all .parties in interest, service of process,
hearings and notice of the foreclosure sale. Id. Certain defects in notice may subject
the sale to being set aside. See id. § 7.16, at 468.
An alternate method of foreclosure is the power of sale foreclosure. Under this
method the notice requirements vary, but they are usually less onerous than the
requirements in judicial foreclosure. Id. § 7.19, at 475.
98. E.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 726 (West Supp. 1983); Ga. Code Ann. § 44-14-
187 (1982); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 581.03 (1945); see G. Osborne, G. Nelson & D.
Whitman, supra note 96, § 7.16, at 466 (judicial foreclosure); id. § 7.19, at 475
(power of sale foreclosure).
99. See Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 427 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1982), appeal argued, No. 82-4433 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 1983). The American Bar
Association has approved a resolution supporting legislation that would "amend the
fraudulent conveyance provisions of state law and the federal Bankruptcy Code to
make it clear that property purchased at a properly conducted non-collusive foreclo-
sure sale is to be considered transferred for reasonably equivalent value." Summary
of Action of the House of Delegates, A.B.A. Ann. Meeting 31 (Aug. 2-3, 1983).
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the original common law of fraudulent conveyances, which did not
condemn non-collusive mortgage foreclosure sales. 100 Because Con-
gress endorsed this common law at the time of enactment of the
fraudulent transfer sections of its bankruptcy legislation,' 0' adopting
the presumption that "reasonably equivalent value" is received at
regularly conducted non-collusive mortgage foreclosure sales also
gives effect to the intent of the legislature. This approach thus best
interprets the requirement of "reasonably equivalent value" in the
specific context of a regularly conducted non-collusive mortgage fore-
closure sale and simultaneously removes such sales from the class of
transfers voidable under section 548(a)(2), as Congress had intended.
A complete analysis of this approach, however, necessitates consider-
ation of good faith as a factor in determining "reasonably equivalent
value" in mortgage foreclosure sales.
2. Good Faith as a Factor in Determining Reasonably
Equivalent Value
Under section 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act, "fair consideration"
required a showing that the property was transferred in good faith
and for fair equivalent value.10 2 With little explanation, 0 3 the drafters
of the Bankruptcy Code removed the good faith requirement and
adopted the "reasonably equivalent value" standard. 0 4 The Commis-
sion on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States (Commission), from
whose draft this change was taken, 05 explained that this change was
made because the term "fair consideration" had been "confusing as to
its requirement of good faith."'1 6
100. See supra notes 13, 15 and accompanying text.
101. See Commission Report, supra note 52, at 20; H.R. Rep. No. 1409, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1937); Analysis of H.R. 12889, supra note 40, at 213 n.2; Amici
Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 20. See supra notes 20-63 and accompanying text.
102. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67(d) (1) (e) (1), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938) (superseded
by 11 U.S.C. § 548 (a)(2)(A) (1982)).
103. See Commission Report, supra note 52, at 177 n.2; see also S. Rep. No. 989,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 89-90 (1978) (no discussion of change in language); H.R. Rep.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1977) (same).
104. Compare Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67(d)(1)(e), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938) with
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1982).
105. Compare Commission Report, supra note 52, at 175-76 with 11 U.S.C. § 548
(1982).
106. Commission Report, supra note 52, at 177 n.2. Commentators indicate that
the confusion surrounding the good faith requirement originated in the historical lack
of an adequate definition for the term. See Comment, The New Bankruptcy Act: A
Revision of Section 67d-The Death of a Dilemma, 7 Hofstra L. Rev. 537, 541
(1979); see also 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, supra note 20, 548.07, at 548-61 ("The
unpredictable circumstances in which the courts may find its presence or absence
render any definition of 'good faith' inadequate.").
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One court has seized upon this change in language as evidence that
the position taken in Madrid is incorrect. In Gillman v. Preston
Family Investment Co. (In re Richardson) ,'107 the court determined
that a non-collusive mortgage foreclosure sale was voidable under
section 548(a)(2).108 The Richardson court held that the Madrid ap-
proach, which employs a presumption that "reasonably equivalent
value" has been exchanged in non-collusive foreclosure sales, necessar-
ily reads good faith into section 548(a) (2) (A) and is therefore inconsis-
tent with the deletion of the good faith requirement.'0 9 Accordingly,
the court required an examination of all the circumstances involved in
the transaction," 0 reserving the determination of the issue of reason-
able equivalence for trial."' Richardson's reasoning is flawed, how-
ever, because the court refused to examine good faith as a factor in
determining "reasonably equivalent value."
Courts generally determine "reasonably equivalent value" by exam-
ining all the circumstances surrounding the transfer." 2 Although sec-
tion 548(a)(2)(A) no longer requires that a transfer that may be the
subject of avoidance be effected in good faith, the use of good faith as
a factor in determining whether "reasonably equivalent value" was
exchanged has not been eliminated." 3 The utilization of good faith as
a factor was recognized in Cooper v. Smith," 4 in which the court was
asked to void a non-collusive foreclosure sale under section
548(a) (2).1"5 The Cooper court analyzed value as the Richardson court
had, by considering all factors presented. 116 Cooper, however, recog-
nized that the good faith of the parties is one of the factors that should
be considered' 17 and did not allow the transfer to be voided." 8 Conse-
quently, good faith has not been completely excised from the determi-
nation of "reasonably equivalent value," and therefore, the applica-
tion of the Madrid presumption remains the best approach for
determining the voidability of regularly conducted non-collusive
mortgage foreclosure sales. Policy considerations further support the
view that non-collusive mortgage foreclosure sales should not fall
within the purview of section 548(a)(2).
107. 23 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
108. Id. at 437.
109. Id. at 447.
110. See id. at 448.
111. See id. at 444.
112. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
113. See Cooper v. Smith, 24 Bankr. 19, 23 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982).
114. 24 Bankr. 19 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982).








Prior to the Durrett decision, the purchaser of property at a foreclo-
sure sale bought it subject to the standard risks in that type of real
estate transaction. 1 9 In the aftermath of Durrett, however, the pur-
chase of such property for a price later determined by a court to be less
than seventy percent of fair market value is subject to a new risk: The
debtor whose property he had bought might file a petition under the
Bankruptcy Code within one year after the sale, thereby permitting
the trustee or debtor-in-possession to avoid the transaction. 120 A sub-
stantial number of title insurance companies will not insure against
this risk, 121 and therefore, one consequence of Durrett is to affect
adversely the marketability of property sold at foreclosure sales. 122
The uncertainty of title caused by Durrett may inhibit competitive
bidding at foreclosure sales, 12 3 and as a result, increase the likelihood
of deficiency judgments against debtors. 12 4 In addition, debtors will
be less likely to realize any of the equity in their property due to the
decreased prices received at foreclosure sales. 25
Another possible adverse effect of this uncertainty is to decrease the
availability of credit. Because of the new risks involved in mortgage
lending after Durrett, creditors will have to discount the value of
collateral below the value it could be assumed to have had when
119. See Coppel & Kann, supra note 11, at 676. Before Durrett was decided, the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale could expect to obtain clear and marketable title to
the property "subject only to any statutory redemption right or senior encumbrance."
Id.
120. See Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 987 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), affl'd, 22
Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982); Pasion & Altizer, Effect of Bankruptcy on Prepetition
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sales, 17 Bev. Hills B.A.J. 11, 12 (1982). Although the
trustee is given the right under Durrett to set aside certain foreclosure sales, the
complaint to set aside the sale may be filed up to two years after the trustee is
appointed. 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) (1982). The appointment of the trustee, furthermore,
may take place at some indefinite time after the filing of the petition. Alsop v.
Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 987 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), aff'd, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska
1982); see Lovell v. Mixon, No. 82-1844, slip op. at 9 (8th Cir. Oct. 31, 1983). Thus,
the risk to the purchaser at the foreclosure sale can extend well beyond the one year
period in § 548(a)(2).
121. Coppel & Kann, supra note 11, at 677 n.5; see Pasion & Altizer, supra note
120, at 12.
122. See Coppel & Kann, supra note 11, at 677; Gold, supra note 57, at 23, col. 1.
123. Moore v. Gilmore, No. C-83-232, slip op. at 6 (E.D. Wash. July 6, 1983);
Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 987 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), aff'd, 22 Bankr. 1017
(D. Alaska 1982); A.B.A. Report, supra note 7, at 4.
124. Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 29-30; A.B.A. Report, supra note 7, at 4;
see Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Clark, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982).
125. See A.B.A. Report, supra note 7, at 4.
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acquisition of marketable title at foreclosure sales was more certain. 126
Under section 548(c), 127 the secured creditor who acquires the debtor's
property at a foreclosure sale may obtain a lien on the property for the
value of his debt even after the foreclosure sale has been avoided.1
2 8
This will be of little consolation to the creditor, however, in light of
"the uncertainty of standards, the limitation of value, and the time
delays imposed by that section,' ' 129 all of which will diminish the value
of the security. Furthermore, section 548(c) does not award the se-
cured creditor the costs of foreclosure or interest.30 The detrimental
ramifications of the Durrett approach to section 548(a)(2) were re-
cently highlighted in a report by the Section on Real Property, Pro-
bate and Trust Law of the American Bar Association, which con-
cluded that "[t]he entire result [of Durrett] will have a severe adverse
effect on the economy and stifle mortgage and other secured invest-
ments at a time when they should be encouraged.' 31 Thus, the ulti-
126. Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 7, at 32.
127. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1982).
128. Id. The secured creditor will be able to retain such a lien, if he "takes for
value and in good faith." Id.
129. Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 987 n.7 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), aff'd, 22
Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982).
130. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1982).
131. A.B.A. Report, supra note 7, at 5. The implications of applying § 548(a)(2) to
non-collusive mortgage foreclosure sales extend to personal property sales. Under
§ 9-504(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code, collateral may be sold "by public or
private proceedings" but every aspect of the sale must be "commercially reasonable."
U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1978). The receipt of a low price at such a sale when a better
price could have been obtained by other means does not alone establish, under the
U.C.C., that the sale was not commercially reasonable. See U.C.C. § 9-507(2)
(1978). Commentators have argued that the Durrett approach is equally applicable
to the sale of personal property collateral under § 9-504 of the U.C.C. See Alden,
Gross & Borowitz, supra note 12, at 1623; Coppel & Kann, supra note 11, at 681.
Such an application might well result in lenders becoming reluctant to grant loans on
security they may now be unable to foreclose upon. See A.B.A. Report, supra note 7,
at 5.
The Durrett rule may have yet another detrimental economic effect: applying
§ 548(a) (2) to void non-collusive mortgage foreclosure sales may cause lenders to halt,
or at least reduce, nonrecourse financing. Under § 704(d) of the Internal Revenue
Code, "[a] partner's distributive share of partnership loss[es] shall be allowed only to
the extent of the adjusted basis of [his] interest in the partnership at the end of the
partnership year in which such loss occurred." I.R.C. § 704(d) (1984). Nonrecourse
liabilities of a limited partnership may be added to the bases of limited partners,
giving them bases for their partnership in excess of their actual capital contribution.
As a result, a limited partner participating in a typical real estate development
partnership "may be able to deduct a share of partnership losses in excess of his
capital contribution, reduced by prior distributions to him." 2 A. Willis, Partnership
Taxation § 56.02, at 137 (2d ed. 1976). The opportunity to take such deductions has
made real estate tax shelter syndications very attractive to limited partners. Id.
Because neither the partners nor the partnership assume personal liability on a
mortgage acquired through nonrecourse financing, the lender of such financing can
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mate consequences of Durrett will be an increase in the cost of credit
and a negative impact upon the marketability of property sold at
foreclosure sales.
B. Effect On State Foreclosure Policies
In approximately one-half of the states, the debtor whose property
has been sold in a foreclosure sale has a statutory right to redeem the
property for a certain period of time. 32 This right of redemption has
been criticized for inhibiting participation at foreclosure sales,'133
thereby lowering the prices received at such sales and increasing
deficiency judgements.134 The adverse effects of statutory redemption
periods have discouraged their use in many states. 135
The policy of encouraging stability of title in those states rejecting
statutory rights of redemption would, to a large degree, be defeated
by the holding in Durrett. Under Durrett, if a bankruptcy petition is
filed within one year of the date of the foreclosure sale, the sale may
be subject to avoidance. 136 The actual attempt by a trustee to void the
sale, however, may occur at some indefinite time in the future.1 37
obtain repayment after the borrowers have defaulted only by foreclosing upon the
mortgaged property. The Durrett rule, however, jeopardizes the lender's ability to
obtain repayment by selling the foreclosed property-because the foreclosure sale may
be subject to avoidance. Thus, the lender is now potentially unable to obtain his
repayment from any source. Faced with this uncertainty, it is likely that lenders will
reevaluate their nonrecourse financing policies, which in turn will adversely affect
real estate tax shelter syndications. Telephone interview with Robert M. Zinman,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Federal Bankruptcy Legislation of the American
Council of Life Insurance (Nov. 28, 1983).
132. G. Osborne, G. Nelson & D. Whitman, supra note 96, § 8.4, at 537; e.g.,
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-1282 (1982); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 426.220 (1972); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.3140 (West Supp. 1983); N.D. Cent. Code § 32-19-18
(1976); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 21-52-1 to -32 (1979 & Supp. 1983); Wyo. Stat.
§ 1-18-103 (1977 & Supp. 1983).
133. See Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 987 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), aj'd, 22
Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982); G. Osborne, G. Nelson & D. Whitman, supra note 96,
§ 8.4, at 538; Comment, Statutory Redemption: The Enemy of Home Financing, 28
Wash. L. Rev. 39, 40 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Statutory Redemption].
134. Statutory Redemption, supra note 133, at 40; see A.B.A. Report, supra note
7, at 4.
135. Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 987 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), affd, 22
Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982). One state, California, has recently abolished its
statutory redemption period. Compare Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 725a (West 1980)
with Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 725a (West Supp. 1983).
136. See Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980);
Alden, Gross & Borowitz, supra note 12, at 1606-07; Pasion & Altizer, supra note
120, at 12; A.B.A. Report, supra note 7, at 1.
137. The complaint to set aside the sale may be filed up to two years after the
trustee is appointed. 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) (1982). The appointment of the trustee,
however, may take place at some indefinite time in the future. Alsop v. Alaska, 14
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Thus, the Durrett rule creates "a de facto redemption right in bank-
ruptcy situations"138 that results in a destabilizing effect upon the title
of property purchased at foreclosure sales.1 39 This effect is precisely
what many states hoped to avoid by refusing to enact a statutory
redemption period.
Moreover, the rule in Durrett conflicts with unanimously followed
state policy. It is widely recognized that foreclosure sales often bring
low prices,140 and state courts in all jurisdictions refuse to invalidate
mortgage foreclosure sales based upon mere inadequacy of price.14'
Consequently, the application of section 548(a)(2) to void any foreclo-
sure sale in which less than seventy percent of fair market value is
received interferes substantially with each state's interest in ensuring
stability of title. 42 By holding that section 548(a)(2) is not applicable
to regularly conducted, non-collusive mortgage foreclosure sales, or
alternatively, that the price received at such foreclosure sales is pre-
sumed to be "reasonably equivalent value," courts can eliminate the
Durrett right of redemption and prevent chaos in state foreclosure
policies and the national credit market.
CONCLUSION
Congress' use of broad language in delineating the transfers subject
to avoidance under section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code has led
courts to apply this section to void regularly conducted non-collusive
mortgage foreclosure sales. The legislative history of section 548(a) (2),
however, indicates that this section was not intended to change the
historic non-voidability of non-collusive mortgage foreclosure sales
under fraudulent conveyance law. Moreover, the detrimental effects
upon credit markets and state foreclosure policies that result from
Bankr. 982, 987 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), aff'd, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982); see
Lovell v. Mixon, No. 82-1844, slip op. at 9 (8th Cir. Oct. 31, 1983).
138. Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 987 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), aff'd, 22
Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982); see Moore v. Gilmore, No. C-83-232, slip op. at 5,
(E.D. Wash. July 6, 1983); Pasion & Altizer, supra note 120, at 12.
139. See Moore v. Gilmore, No. C-83-232, slip op. at 6 (E.D. Wash. July 6, 1983);
Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 987 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), aff'd, 22 Bankr. 1017
(D. Alaska 1982); Pasion & Altizer, supra note 120, at 12.
140. Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 1980)
(Clark, J., dissenting) ("[li]t is generally known that such sales do not bring the best
price"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); Washburn, supra note 92, at 871 ("[d]is-
tress sales often produce very low prices"); see Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co.
(In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 446 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) ("the price obtained at
foreclosure sales is weak evidence of value").
141. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
142. See Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 427 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1982), appeal argued, No. 82-4433 (9th Cir. Feb. 18, 1983); Alsop v. Alaska, 14
Bankr. 982, 987 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), aff'd, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982).
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permitting such avoidances under the Bankruptcy Code further dem-
onstrate that an extension of the application of section 548(a)(2) to
non-collusive foreclosure sales is not warranted. The implications of
subjecting such foreclosure sales to avoidance under the fraudulent
transfer section of the Bankruptcy Code have already inspired legisla-
tive attempts to correct this problem. 143 Until an amendment to the
Bankruptcy Code specifically narrowing the scope of section 548(a) (2)
is passed, however, courts should adopt a presumption that "reasona-
bly equivalent value" is the value received at regularly conducted non-
collusive mortgage foreclosure sales, thus removing such sales from
avoidance under section 548(a) (2).
Edward Goodman
143. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
